


# Man Overboard - Fatal Morgan of Marietta

2022 Newport  
Bermuda Race  
Based on the US  
Sailing Inquiry



# background

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Morgan of Marietta is a Centurion 42 – a 42-foot monohull

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Colin Goldner was the 74-year-old skipper & experienced offshore racer (10 Newport Bermuda Races)

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Colin weighed 250 – 300 lb., 5 ft 9 in tall

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8-person crew: 2 were new to the crew. All others were experienced onboard. Two watch sections of 4 people in each.

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Crew expected winds in the 20 – 25 knot range between the start of the race (Friday) and Sunday afternoon.

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# events



**1100** – watch change. Colin came on watch. Morgan of Marietta was on a starboard tack. Wind at 290 -330 T, heading 160 - 190. Full main & #3 genoa. Changing helmsman every 30 minutes.

**1200** – Wind low to mid 20's with gusts. Waves consistently 10 feet with some 12 – 18 feet. Water temp 73 F (south of the Gulf Stream). Boat speed 8 – 10 knots, heeled 15 degrees average.

**1215** – Colin was seated on starboard side of cockpit, forward & was not wearing a life jacket or tether. Other three crew members were wearing lifejackets & were clipped in with tethers (some double) .

**1225** – Large wave hits the boat. Washes over crew, buries rail. Colin is washed overboard over the top of the leeward lifelines. Heel angle of 50 degrees was recorded.

**Immediately** – Spotter held visual contact with Colin. Crew hit MOB button on chartplotter. Lifesling was readied. Helmsman backwinded the sails & executed a quick stop.

**Within 2 minutes** – Off watch crew donned life jackets & came on deck. Dropped 2 cushions in the water, took down jib, started engine.

**Within 5 minutes** – Colin got himself into the life sling. Morgan of Marietta was never more than 300 yards from Colin. Superb boat handling by crew.

Colin drowned while being pulled in the Lifesling back to the boat.


# Lessons Learned

Even with appropriate boat handling, well executed MOB maneuvering, in broad daylight, and warm water, Colin drowned.

*Bottom line: Stay onboard!*

If Colin had been wearing a lifejacket and had been tethered in, this would not have happened.

All other lessons are secondary. Tragically this was 100% avoidable.





# Lessons Learned

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Every boat needs a policy on lifejackets and tethers. Lifejacket & tether is NOT a “personal decision”. The entire crew is at risk when a person goes overboard.

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On a vessel with a “culture of safety”, the crew feels free to speak up. They provide “Strong and forceful backup”.

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A “second in command” needs to be formally designated by the skipper.

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MOM 8A (deployable floating rescue collar & pylon) was not deployed. It is unlikely it would have made a difference.

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Crews need realistic training on how to get a MOB back onboard their particular boat including recovering a person who is incapacitated (injury, cold, etc.)

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Crew had great difficulty recovering the body. Recovering person that is not capable of helping themselves presents significant challenges.

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Excellent decision not to put a person in the water in this situation. Think long and hard before putting a rescue swimmer in the water.



# Lessons Learned

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The Iridium Go SATCOM system used the skipper's cell phone as the interface. No crewmember had the PIN to unlock that phone.

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Crew had difficulty operating the DSC feature of the VHF radio. Morgan of Marietta's VHF was set to low power.

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General training: All crew members should be able to operate VHF radio, start the engine, use the SATCOM, Lifesling, MOM-8A, etc. The importance of pre-sail safety practice cannot be over emphasized.

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Two nearby boats did not respond to VHF calls. Note that this has occurred in other ocean races recently. One had the volume set very low and one could not hear the radio in the cockpit. Boats needing assistance should consider parachute flares in addition to a VHF call.

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
Crew had unrealistic expectations for a USCG on scene response. Morgan of Marietta was outside helicopter range and the victim was already dead. USCG did not dispatch any assets.

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
This incident occurred during the day, in warm water, and relatively good visibility. Conditions could have been much worse.



Blue line is the 300 NM operational range of USCG MH-60 helicopters from air stations at Cape Cod and Atlantic City, New Jersey. There are no rescue helicopters in Bermuda.







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